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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
CATHARINE S. GIBBONS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
-vs-
BYRON BRIMM, and 'vife 
HILDA A, BRIMM, 
Defendattts and Respondents 
Case No. 7596 
RESPONDENT'S 
BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial 
District of the State of Utah, in and 
for the County of Cache 
Hon. Lewis Jones, Judge 
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it 
leepondeat' s Stateaeat ot Facts --··----·-···----
Point No. 1: fraa the ieeuea made 'ne Chaaeellor 
found \he teral of the contract e~eref into be\wea. 
the par\iea ( Catheriae and Hilda-t-Finding Jlo. 10), 
h.'bstantia.l pe:fformance t,hereot ol the par\ ot HUda 
with BJron' e~ cooperation as far at possible, etc., 
and that the nd.d .tindinc, concludon and deoree · 
based thereon ie entitled.· uder t~e law to be aftimtd 
by this Court; also, answer, disc~ssion aad ~· J 
of matters speci!ie4 in Appellaat'• Point No. l -- 1 
Point No. 2: Appellant having hertelt either tor tri• ·, 
Ylal excttses or rea.sone, or tor rone at all, ref11sed 
further· performance., and substa.niial pel'toftaraee 
havi.n- been ~nade, given and stilJ offered to appeU• 
aat, the n.i)pel1.ant makes out no ~ase tor rescission, 
cancellat,ion, or other equitabl relief th&lt that 
given in the Decree, and that t 'Decree of the Chaa-
eellor is entitled to be upheld all pArt~.eulart~J 
also, ans-r.~er, discussioa aad an 7ais of matter• 
raised in Appellant's Po:tnt No. .-------------·--- 1. 
~ 
i Point No. 3: !he Chancellor did t by ita Pinding 1 
Jo. U make a new an4 ditte?en.\ ontract, but did 
1D .!.ccordanoe with weU•known a defined equitable 
principles resolve the difteren s between the par-
ties, and tha\ sucah finding1 co lusion and decree 
based th&reon is abttnclan\17 sup rted. both taetuallr I 
and in law; also, ansll""8r1 cliscu_ ion and an&l71i1 · 
ot matters raised in Appellant' Point lo. 3 --·-·-
Poin.t No. 4.1 The consideration f the ae•ipent ot 
Swenson note and rn.ortgage was t same •• the coD• 
aideration for maldnc the other onveyanoee, etc. 
herein; that tile traaactioa nta out aa action ia 
personam, no·t. looalJ that when .1e Idaho etdt was 
iaetituted \he Uta action had • peDflina tor so•• 
JBOntha and. the lower eourt prop 7 aeauec.t juri•· 
dict,ioa under ieaeral law and U · Rulee ot Cidl 
Procedure; also ans\.!er, diseuse n and anal7ei1 ot 
matters raised in A.ppellaat' e ~ t lo. 4 -------- ' 
Coaolusion ~----·--·------···------~--------------
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
C.A.THARINE S. GIBBONS, 
Plaintiff and .A.ppellant 
-vs-
BYRON BRI~f11, and \Yife 
HILDA A, BRIMM, 
Defendants and Respondents 
Case No. 7596 
RESPONDENT'S 
BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents deem appellant's statement of facts 
wholly inadequate to inform this court of the basis of 
lower court's holding, nor does respondent's wholly a-
gree with apellant's statement, and therefore feels that 
it will be helpful to fully state to the Court corrective 
facts, as well as considerable additional information. 
Blood relationship exists between Catherine and 
Hilda. Hilda is a niece as well as a sister by adoption 
and over the years there existed between them implicit 
trust in one another and a bond of affection resembling 
that of mother and daughter. They saw much of one 
another particularly after 1938. Catherine had been 
married four times, once widowed and thrice divorced 
When her mother became ill in 1938, Catherine came 
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ho1ne to nurse and care for her until her death in 1938. 
Catherine's health has been delicate for some years 
prior to 1948, and during this time she was assisted in 
hPr illness and otherwise alrnost entirely by Hilda. She 
relied upon Hlida more than any other person and 
1-1 ilda never failed her. Regardless of where Hilda was 
\\'Orking she came to assist and care for Catherine, on 
\veek-ends and at other times. (Tr. 154, 212-21, 281, 151-
3 ( Over the years Hilda was the only one Cath-
erine got along with for any p e r i o d o f tim e. 
Hilda a s s i s t e d her both before and after her 
1narriage. Catherine had always promised that 
upon her death Hilda should inherit what she had. 
(Tr. 314 ,418), and she actually made out her will giv-
ing all to Hilda (Tr. 54, 419), and upon such promises 
having been made, Hilda conveyed her 1/9th interest 
in property to Catherine. (Tr. 154, 155, 314, 419). There 
never were any serious differences between Catherine 
and Hilda and it is doubtful that there are any now. 
Catherine unreason_ably formed a dislike for Bryon. 
( Tr. 359, 360). Ever since then her chief complaint is 
ti1a t she does not like Byron ; everything would be all 
right if Hilda divorced her husband, which she of course 
cannot do to please Catherine. (Tr. 198.) 
Hilda and Bryon were married December 23, 1947. 
Before then Catherine had only seen Bryon about four 
times (Tr. 43, 162; 337). They resided in Ogden in an 
apartment and Hilda was and still is ·teaching school 
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there. _..-\t the thue of their 1narriage Byron 'vas recover-
ing fro1n an illness. He 'vas entirely 'veil before tT une 
1948, and there is no evidence to the contrary. Since the 
death of Catherine's 1nother about October, 1947, her 
brother, Geo. L ..... ~nderson and his 'vife stayed with 
Catherine and had planted the crops in the spring of 
1948. They suddenly decided to leave ( Tr. 44-5). Cather-
ine still in poor health about June 1, 1948, could not be 
alone and so called and asked Hilda if they 'vould not 
n1ove to n1endon and care for her and the farm. This 
they did, after some bargaining as to pay to be received 
by Bryon for operating the farm for the balance of the 
year, 19±8. Catherine does not get along \vith any of her 
brothers and sisters (Tr. 237, 241). Hilda assisted Cath-
erine and performed the household duties while Byron 
did the farm work and cared for the premises for the 
balance of the year 1948, and during this time they all 
got along well. (Tr. 47-8) When school started Catherine 
accompanied Hilda and lived in the apartment. Cather-
ine had agreed to pay Byron good wages for caring or 
the premises the balance of the year 1948, · besides such 
expenses as he personally paid. ( Tr. 340-43 etc.) And 
just before Byron left for Minnesota Catherine offered 
to pay him, but the time being short he said let it go 
until his return. (Tr. 345-6). After conveyance of the 
property hereinafter mentioned and at Hilda's sugges-
tion Byron just forgot about his claim for services and 
advances which the court found to be reasonably worth 
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$1200.00 (Tr. 55, 352) At this tirne all was still harmony 
l ,Pt,veen the parties. 
While Byron was in ~linnesota Catherine became 
ill again and \VaH taken to the Dee Hospital, Ogden. 
''rhile there Hilda did all possible for her and supple-
rnented hospital attention by staying with her. (Tr. 164, 
271, 276). Bryon happened to return from Minnesota 
the day Catherine 'vas released frorn the hospital and 
so brought her back to the apartment. (Tr. 166, 348). 
Shortly after her return from the hospital Catherine 
first asked Hilda and then Byron to go to Logan to 
obtain some descriptions from Attorney L. E. 
Nelson, which he finally did, and following this Cather~ 
ine asked Bryon to take these descriptions to Attorney 
Dickens and have him prepare a deed conveying the~ 
property to Hilda (Tr. 349-50). After Attorney Dickens 
prepared the deed (Ex. Q) she, on January 5, 1949, 
after being warned of the dangers in so doing, then 
executed and delivered it to Hilda. (Tr. 236-40). At 
the san1e time the bill of sale (Ex. U) was executed. 
From these references it is abundantly clear that Cather-
ine vvas not ''induced'' by the defendant, Hilda, or any-
one else, to convey the 8-/9th interest in the property 
(Ex .. Q) nor was the bill of sale (Ex. U) "procured with-
out plaintiff's knowledge'' as is stated in appellant's 
brief. From the .references just made, it is also apparent 
that Catherine said she wanted to and did convey among 
others reasons to, "save costs of probate" (Tr. 169), 
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hei- staten1ent to the contrary not,vithstanding. At any 
rte~ thereafter Catherine said she 'vas glad she had 
everything fixed up. ( Tr. 277). In fact, on June 22, 
1949, nearly six n1onths after execution and delivery of 
Exhibits Q and lT~ Catherine then being represented by 
her attorney Mr. Nelson, authorized the purchase of the 
remaining 1/9 interest in the property (Ex. Q) from 
her brother, John C. ~\nderson, and conveyed the same 
to Hilda, (Ex. P) (Tr. 357-9). And on February 23, 1949, 
Catherine executed and delivered the assignment of 
mortgage ( defs. Ex. 3) to Hilda, the same having been 
prepared by .. A.ttroney Dickens at the request of Cather-
ine. ( Tr. 239, 240, 353-4). Furthermore, at no time from 
Jtme 1, 1948, to the time of the execution of Exhibit Q 
on June 22, 1949, \Vas there any friction at all between 
the parties; they lived together as a family unit happily 
in the aprtment as well as when at the Mendon home. 
And the manner of their so doing ought to be sufficient 
proof of the nature of the agreement had between them 
with respect to the reasons for the delivery of the several 
instruments, etc., embraced in this action. That they all 
so lived happily see testimony of the follo,ving witnes-
ses: Ruby Keele who stayed with Catherine (Tr. 227-
33); Hazel Haeft (Tr. 274-7); Edward Haeft (Tr. 278;-
9); Ethel Piper, (Tr. 262-6, 268-72); Dr. J. C. Hayward, 
(Tr. 297-300, 302); Attorney Dickens, (Tr. 241). 
The pleadings put in issue the nature and the terms 
of the agreement entered into between Catherine and 
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I-Iilda. Defendants only denied there was any agreement 
betw~en Catherine and Bryon. Bryon simply told his 
'vi fe that if she wanted to enter into the undertaking 
'"ith Catherine, it was agreeable with him and that he 
\vould cooperate with her in her endeavor. Even Cath-
erine says she had no agreement with Bryon. There 
\Va:-; no dispute at all about this. The overwhelming pre-
ponderence of the evidence including the manner in 
'v hich the parties lived together until discord came be-
t,veen them, sustains the nature of the agreement enter-
ea into between Catherine and Hilda as found by the 
court in its finding No. 10 (Tr. 52). The crux of the 
trial went rather to the broad question of performance 
or justification for non-performance if such was the fact. 
The pleadings, plainiff 's amended complaint, third 
cause of action, put in issue the question as to whether 
Hilda used moneys transferred by Catherine to their 
join names for purposes other than intended, i.e. other-
'vise than for Catherine's benefit. Catherine had alleged 
she never saw ·bank statements, returned checks, didn't 
kno\v the bank account was closed, that much of the 
moneys had been used for Hilda and Byron's benefit, 
etc. The evidence as to these allegations was overwhelm-
ingly against Catherine's assei:tions, the checks them-
selves produced in court shows most of them were drawn 
by Catherine herself and that every cent was used for 
Catherine's benefit and desires, and that in addition 
thereto Hilda had personally spent $381.95 for Cather-
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ine ~s needs. ( Tr. 48). See also "Exhibits in Lieu of 
Deposition, (Tr. 21-24) In plaintiff's fourth cause of 
action (Tr. 23) she alleged that she 'vas the owner o:f 
certain personal property described in paragraph 1 of 
the value of about $2,000.00, and the evidence conclus-
ively showed that all of the personal proptery was old 
and of little value, that she personally had sold and re-
ceived pay for part of it (Tr. 263) and that she never 
ilid o"\\rn the .... lUis-Chalmers tractor and attachments 
which "\Yas purchased by the defendants for 'vhich they 
paid $1-±10.00. (Tr. 360-63) -She also alleged she has no 
kno,vledge of executing the bill of sale. 
Finally, and as a reason for rescission, appellant 
alleges throughout each of her several causes of action 
in substance that defendants and each of them refused 
to live with or associate with the appellant, or render 
services to her, or speak to her, that she was not wanted, 
that they were unkind to her, and that she was compelled 
to seek other living quarters, etc., etc. Even at the ex-
pense of unduly lenghtening this brief, it is believed 
such accusations justify pointing out quite fully the hap-
penings in these several regards. A good starting time is 
June 22, 1949, because before that time there was no dis-
pute between the parties: Catherine had spent the fall of 
1948, to June of 1949, with the Brimms in their apartment. 
Byron had finished with the work on the farm and about 
Xmas time he went to Minnesota to visit with his rel-
atives. In the meantime Catherine had become ill and 
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hospitalized. It was thereafter she made the several con-
veyanee~ 1nentioned to Hilda.· Byron and hired women 
~tayed with and care for Catherine in the day time 
\\·hile Hilda continued. with her teaching. When spring 
opened Byron 'vent to Mendon to put in the crops. 
'V hen school closed, about June 1, 1949, both Hilda 
and Catherine returned to 1\Iendon. They all lived to-
gether as happily as any family unit could. Then one day 
in June, 1949, Catherine's brother, John C. Anderson 
":-anted a 5-acre tract of land for his 1/9 interest. Cath-
erine then sent Hilda and Byron to Logan to make the 
he~t cash settlement possible with her brother. $2,000.00 
'vas agreed upon, and this an1ount was drawn from the 
bank and paid to the brother, attorney L. E. Nelson pre-
paring the deed for Catherine. (Ex. P.) When the 
Brhnms reported the settlement Catherine became fur-
ious, said she did not want settlen1ent but wanted a 
fight, a law suit, 'vith her brother. (Tr. 181, 357-9). 
She then said she would shoot him, Byron, if she had 
a gun, etc. Byron then to avoid quarrelling remained 
a'vay from her as much as possible by working late, 
listening to the radio in the barn, etc., while Hilda con-
tinued to perform the duties about the house. In August, 
1949, Catherine became ill and was taken to the hospital 
in Logan ·(Tr. 367). Hilda returned to Ogden to teach . 
.i\.fter Catherine's release from the hospital, Byron and 
Hilda took. her to the apartment, which was agreeable 
"rith her.· (Tr. 368). Byron stayed on the farm until 
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Dec. 20~ 1949, on \vhich date he ".,.,ent to Minnesota to 
'isit 'vith rela.tiYes and- returned to Ogden about Feb. 
~). 1930. He then ~tayed at the Earle Hotel because 
<._:atherine didn't \Vant hhn around, she sneared at hitn, 
said they could get along together all right if he wasn't 
around .... -\fter staying in the hotel a fe\v days Catherine 
left, and he then returned to the apartment. (Tr. 368-72) 
One cold day in February, 1950, Catherine went to Men-
don and Hilda and attorney Dickens immediately "\Vent 
after her and brought her back the sa1ne day. The rea-
sons for fetching her back are obvious. (Tr. 242,43,186-
188). She still \vould not stay in the apartment ( Tr. 81) 
and so the next day \Yas taken to ~irs. Thornton's apart-
Inent ( Tr. 188-92) Byron then returned to the apartment. 
(Tr. 368-72). About the middle of March, 1950, Byron 
\vent to "Jfendon to resume farm work. On about May 18, 
1950, Catherine went to Mendon and the following day 
the Brimms went to ~Iendon, school having let out. 
(Tr. 193-200) l~pon the Brinllils arriving at the home 
Catherine ordered them out of the house. interferred 
\Vith cooking of meals, throwing meat and potatoes 
off the stove on to the floor, kicked the milk bucket over, 
slapped Hilda's face, tore h~r dress, threatened to burn 
the car \Vith Kerosene, etc. During this episode Hilda 
did \vhat she could and what was necessary to control 
Catherine somewhat, but still no ill, will against her. 
It is believed the foregoing constitutes ra~her a complete 
outline of the salient facts which transpired between 
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the parties while they remained together, and based upo:Q. 
'vhic the court entered its decree. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant's l)oint No. 1: Finding of fact No. 10, com-
plained about is abundantly supported by the evidence . 
. A~ previously pointed out, the matter submitted 
to the court hy the plaintiff's amended com-
plaints and defendants' answer and further answer, was 
not whether or not there was an agreement between the 
parties, but 'vho the parties were, and what was the 
agree1nent ~ And from the evidence adduced the court de-
ternlined this ultimate fact (Tr. 51). Byron, for instance, 
never solicited or made any promise to Catherine nor 
was any conveyance made to him. Even Catherine says 
this. (Tr. 56-7, 112, 172, 242), Byron simply agreed with 
his wife to cooperate with her and such is the allega-
tion made by him. Appellant's claim to the contrary is 
simply to cast confusion where there is none. And, as 
appears from reference already made to the testimony, 
Byron did cooperate to the fullest extent Catharine 
would permit. 
Hilda never denied there "vas an agreement. She and 
others repeatedly testified that there always was an a-
greement or understanding as to why the several con- . 
veyance and transfers were made to her (Tr. 309, 317, 
318; 236-40). There was simply a difference in the test-
imony as to when certain statments. were made. The 
background of understanding and the relationship be-· 
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t'veen Hilda never 'vas and could not be disputed. Cath-
arine had already 1nade a 'vill givin all to Hilda. Hilda 
had preYiously conveyed her 1/9 interest to Catherine. 
After this Catherine conveyed her 8/9ths interest in the 
ho1ne property and executed a bill of sale conveying the 
personal property. Thereafter she n1ade an assignment 
of the n1ortgage ..... \nd still later she bought the remaining 
1/9tl\ interest and conYeyed this also to Hilda. She was 
represented by her attorney. Catherine at all times kne'Y 
what she 'Yanted and had it done for her. The court 
could not possibly do otherwise than to find that Cathar-
ine ''"~as at all times capable and competent in all re-
spects to transact business. ''There is no merit at all to 
this assignment.'' 
On page 16 of brief, counsel quotes testimony, ques-
tions and answers, much of 'vhich are simply answers 
to suggestive questions, as to whether or not she volun-
tarily or willingly signed the deed, (and on page 20 he 
lie says this is immaterial) and then states that such 
testimony shows conclusively that she was urged and 
hesitated to sign the deed. Many answers to such state-
ments are obvious. In the first place, Byron, Hilda, 
Ruby l(eele, and Attorney Dickens all testified to the 
contrary as the references already given disclose. Then 
too, the several instruments and transactions occurred 
between January 25, 1949, and June 22, 1949. On this 
last date she was represented by her attorney, M. Nel-
son. Were all of these done involuntarily1 Such a con-
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tention falls of its O'\Vn weight. 'Vas Catherine not carry-
ing out her pro1nise and plan to give all to Hilda~ The 
court could not very \vell find other\vise than it did in 
t hi~ respect. On page 17 counsel also quotes some test-
imony given by Attorney Dickens. We have no quarrel 
with that. We rely upon it. It shows conclusively what 
C~atherine had in mind and her purpose in executing 
the instruments. Counsel next complains on page 18 that 
pain tiff conveyed to Hilda ''to save costs of probate'' is 
ridiculous. The answer to this is that Hilda, Byron and 
~I r. Dickens all so testified. If !Ir. Dickens is to be be-
lieved in one instance, then it would seem he should be 
believed as to this also. In this connection, I submit too 
that it is common kno,vledge that many people make con-
veyances "to save probate". Counsel further says a 
deed was wanted to make the1n more secure. There is 
no vidence of this, but such happened to be the case in 
Chadd vs. !foser, (Utah) 71 Pac. 870, which is also re-
ported in 112 A.L.R. 681. 
On page 19 and 20 counsel cites and quotes from 
Ward vs. Ward (Utah) 85 Pac. 2d, 635, and then states 
that the relationship between the parties in that case 
and this case strongly rese1nbles each other. Such a 
statement is misleading and not the fact at all. The Ward 
case lays do,vn the familiar rule referred to under head-
note 10, elaborated upon at page 641: "The cou~t.sitting 
as a chancellor had the opportunity of measuring all of 
these factors, and since it decided against the defend-
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ant\~ clai1n, 'Ye 1nay not disturb its findings and judg-
ment in the premises''. And again on the san1e page 
Judge ,, ... olf says: ·'I do not think "ye can say that the 
evidence preponderates against the conclusion of the 
court there reached. EYen in equity cases 'Ye do not re-
Yerse 'Yhere, after reading the record, we have doubt as 
to "?hat conclusion of fact should be reached. We then 
adhere to the lower court's decision". It is submitted 
that every single solitary finding made by the court 
in its finding No. 10 is an1ply supported by competent 
evidence; that as to most of these fin_~ings there is not 
even a conflict in the evidence and that where there 
'vas a conflict the court could easily have believed others 
tlian Catherine. To illustrate: The court could easily 
have come to the conclusion that Catherine was not 
alawys "frank" because she often testified "I don't 
remember'', as her testimony discloses. Then too the 
court could easily have come to the conclusion that she 
'vas very often mistaken, because, for example, in her 
fourth cause of action {Tr. 25) she alleged that she was 
the owner of 1 Allis-Chalmer tractor when the evidence 
conclusively shows that Hilda and Byron bought it by 
each paying one-half. (Tr. 360-61); that she had sold 
the side-delivery rake to Hyrum Richards in June, 1948, 
for $175.00 and the manure spreader at the same time to 
Edwin Olson, but nevertheless claimed the defendant 
had it. ( Tr. 363). These are just a few glaring instances 
of being 'vrong. The general statement ,therefore, that 
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the two cases resemble one another is meaningless un-
leHs counsel can marshall facts sufficient to overturn the 
lo\ver court's findings under the rule announced in 
Ward vs. Ward, supra, and it is submitted that such 
fac-ts do not exist. The record n1ost generously supports 
the lower court's finding. It is submitted that seldom 
< loes it occur in any action where proof of so many 
allegations is so lacking. 
In the 'Vard case this court held that the so-called 
''irrevocable will'' was nothing more than a contract 
to leave property if the prospective devise will perform 
certain conditions-a unilateral contract-if the devisee 
fails to perforn1, then the devisor was free to make other 
disposition. In the case at bar the obligations are mutual 
or bilateral-a vast difference. The Ward case is there-
fore no authority for the case at bar, otherwise than 
as in the preceeding paragraph mentioned. A case strik-
ingl:v alike even as to age of parties, complaints made, 
consulting attorney, making advancements, permanent 
improvements, etc., is the case of Chad vs. Moser (Utah) 
71 Pac. 870. It is believed the only difference is that there 
the parties were mother and daughter while in the case at 
bar it is aunt and niece by blood relationship, but for all 
practical purposes the relationship of mother and dau-
ghter existed. In the Chad case the court held there was 
substantial performance and stands for the prepositions 
. t1iat trival complaints will not justify setting aside a 
conveyance, that incapac.ity to contract or undue influ-
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ence "·ill not be presun1ed because of advanced age, even 
tliough in poor health and enfeebled. In the case at bar 
the court 'vas also justified in holding there 'vas sub-
stantial perforn1ance and that the plaintiff herself un-
reasonably by her actions prevented further perform-
ance. For example: She made no complaint on the big 
items-ho'v she 'vas cared for both when ill and well, etc. 
"Catherine's main compaint is against Byron and yet 
there is nothing in the record to show that Byron did 
anything to hurt her in any way, but the record is full 
of things he did to be considerate of her at all times. 
·certainly if he is disliked and not wanted for reasons 
which he cannot help and Catherine will not tolerate 
hnn, there is nothing further he can do. The evidence is 
also replete with instances where Hilda went to all rea-
sonable lengths to make Catherine happy and contented. 
Catherine would not even accept pay for her keep after 
she left. Her complaints were trival, unfounded, and the 
rea s on s for them unreasonable. She refused even 
to try to cooperate. Certainly the lower court was jus-
tified in holding, as it did, when one does all possible 
and the other party unreasonably refuses to go along, 
there is no breach. The obligations are mutual or bi-
lateral and not unilateral. An excellent annotation on the 
subject may be found in 112 A. L. R. 670, and following 
at page 681 is cited the case of Chad vs. Moser, supra. 
At page 20 and 21 counsel cites and quotes from 
Storey-Bracher Lbr. Co. vs. Burnett, (Ore.) 123 Pac. 
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66, but the facts in the cases are not at all similar. There 
the grantees deserted grantors, an old couple. It is in-
teresting to note that the supreme court sustained the 
decision of the trial court and also, that in lieu of the 
property conveyed the court awarded $2500.00, or 
equivalent to $500.00 per year, the life expectancy. At 
page 21. counsel cites and quotes from Bruer vs. Bruer, 
( n[ inn.) 123 N. W. 813 28 L.R.A. (NS) 608. This case is 
unlike the case at bar. This a case of conveyance from 
father to son and the complaint alleged that the de-
fendant failed and refused to comply with the agree-
Inent in many substantial respects which were therein 
enun1erated. The case went to the supreme case on de-
lnurrer and the question was whether or not the plaintiff 
'vas entitled to damages or rescission. The court held 
that ''plaintiff is entitled to such relief as the evidence 
n1ay, on trial, show her entitled to" and further, "We 
cannot hold, in view of prior decisions, that the agree-
ment constituted a condition subsequent entitling plain-
tiff to return of the land; but as remarked in the John-
son case the court may grant such relief a!;' the facts will 
jn equity and good conscience justify.'' Oregon is only 
committed to the doctrine of rescission when there is 
a substantial breach. See 112 A. L. R. page 681 for 
cases. At page 22 counsel cites and quotes from Gustin 
vs. Crockett (Wash) 97 Pac. 1091. This case is not at all 
in point because in the cited case there was a willful 
vio,lation of the agreement to support and in the case 
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at bar no such case can possibly be n1ade out. At page 
22 there is also cited and quoted fron1 Lewelling vs. 
~IcElroy (Neb.) 27 N. ''r· 2d, 268, to the effect that 
"Then the grantee neglects or refuses to co1nply with the 
contract the deed Inay be set aside. A reading of the 
ease discloses that after the conveyance the defendant 
grantee \Yas ill and did little if anything in performance 
of his contract, and that shortly thereafter he died 
\vhereupon his grantee's \vidow, claimed the property. 
The quotation made by appellant is simply a general 
statement of the la\Y 1nade by the court and the quo ... 
tations includes a statement of facts which have no 
application to the facts in the case at bar. It is inter-
esting to note, however, in this case that the grantee 
and his 'vife built a chicken coop and also repaired a 
roof in the value of $150.00, and also paid taxes, and that 
in granting relief the court conditioned relief upon pay-
ment of these items. At page 23 Cree vs. Sherify (Ind.) 
37 N. E. 787, is cited and quoted from. Again the facts 
in the cited case are not at all similar to the facts 
in the case at bar and therefore it has little if ,any value. 
The quotation given is simply a general statement which 
is quoted from 28 Cent. Law J. p 321. The facts in this 
case were that the father conveyed to the son and that 
about six years thereafter the son died. After the death 
of the son his widow and his children remained with the 
father, grantor, for two weeks after which the widow 
and children, over the advice and objections of grantor 
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a handon<'d the conveyed pre1nises, 1noved away, and 
never returned to give grantor any further help. After 
balancing equities, the \\Torth of the board and care 
l'urni:-;ltP<l grantor as against the inco1ne derived fro1n 
th(' prPini:-;e~ by grantee, the court granted rescission 
and the real reason for granting relief at all was because 
t rtP \\·ido\v refused postively to furnish any further aid 
to grantor. 1~he grantor would have pern1itted grantee's 
''Titlo\v to continue had she heen \Villing . 
..:\ppellant's Point No. 2: Here appellant attacks 
thP court's findings nos. 10 and 12, claiming they are 
not supported by the evidence. It is submitted there 
i~ no merit to ~uch contention. At the bottom of page 
2~- to 28 counsel, in an endeavor to show of lack support 
and a breach, complains that beginning with the month 
of J ul)·~ 1949, B~~ron continuously refused to associate 
or live \vith plaintiff, \vouldn't eat at the same table, 
\vouldn 't talk to Catherine very often, that she not only 
1 ost the benefit of his .companionship, etc., but also 
lost a large portion of the care, and companionship of 
_Hjlda, who divided her tin1e bet\veen plaintiff and her 
husband; that after Hilda returned from Minnesota 
after January 1, 1950, she didn't show much interest 
and that it was causing a separation. From these conl-
pa.ints appellant then reasons that such neglect "would 
affect_ plaintiff mentally'' and then makes the state-
Inent that Hilda "abused her physically", followed by 
so1ne testimony to the affect that Hilda would not per-
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1nit her to leave the apart1nent, ete. Such contention~ 
are not difficult to an~"YPr: In thP fir~t phH·P thP plain-
tiff i~ the onl~- one '"ho te~tified to the statPtnents re-
ferred to, n1uch of thi~ testilnony \Ya~ an~\\-t\1'~ to sng-
gl'~tiYe questions, and so n1ight not have been too con-
vincing to the court. Then too 1nost of the claims were 
flatly contradicted not only by Byron and Hilda, but 
al~o by the other "~itnesses. }[any of her complaints 
are trivial. She could not expect Hilda to devote all of 
her ti1ne to her. Hilda "Tas n1arried 'vhen the arrange-
Inent "~as entered into. It is a distortion of the fact 
to ~ay Hilda 'vould not pernrit her to leave the apart-
Inent. She did protest against her leaving in the in-
terests of her health. ...:-l.ny reasonable interpretation 
of the testimony reveals this attitude. Appellant also 
clai1ns she lost the care, attention and companionship 
of Byron for a period of seven months. In more than 
one place she testified she disliked him, wanted nothing 
to do with him, that he promised her nothing and that 
she exacted nothing from him. Complaints are full of 
contradictions. It is believed the references to testi-
Inony previously made is a sufficient answer to these 
con1plaints and that no useful purpose can be accomp·-
lished by following this further. Counsel then quotes 
several cases, which will now be considered. 
Ward vs. Ward has been previously commented 
upon. Payette vs. Ferrier (Wash) 55 Pac. 629, is a 
case 'vhere the lower court granted a lien upon the 
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prPtnises conveyed to grantor, and thereafter the su .. 
pre1ne eourt on appeal, after death of grantee and after 
I 
gntntee has 1nortgaged the premises, the mortgagee hav-
ing conHtructive notice of the terms upon which the land 
"·as conveyed, granted rescission. Here the son put 
hhnself in a position 'vhere he could not perform. 
1~here is no silnilarity at all in the facts-not even as 
to the recitation made by appellant.· In the case at bar, 
respondent did everything possible to try to carry out 
the arrangement, including payment of her keep after she 
left, which was refused on advice of counsel. She re-
sisted perfor1nance. Thomas vs. Thomas (Ore) 33 Pac. 
565 is also entirely different. There the son, grantee, 
sold the lands and also assigned the obligation to care 
for his father, grantor, to a stranger, and thus in this 
Inaner evade his obligation. The court under such cir-
cumstances granted rescission. DeAtley vs. Street 
(~font.) 263 Pac. 967 is entirely different in facts fron1 
anything appearing in the case at bar. In this case father 
conveyed to son upon promise to support. Thereafter the 
son leased to another for a period of five years, left the 
vicinity entirely, and arranged with the tenant and mer-
chant to care for, support and maintain grantor, and 
to furnish them with such things as they might desire. 
The lower court found a 'total failure of consideration 
and the supreme court follo,ving the equitable rule laid 
down in Ward vs. Ward, supra, held that it is ·bound 
by the lower courts finding on conflicting evidence and 
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affirrned the decision of the trial court. It w·ill also 
be noted here that the grantee left the grantor while in 
the case at bar the situation is exaetlY the reverse. And-
erson YS. Reed (N.~l.) 1 ±8 Pae. :l02, is a case \Vhere 
after grantor beeaine stricken, his divorced \Yife called 
to see him and after obtaining conveyances of his prop-
erty., left. The ex-wife claimed the conveyances were 
made to her upon a promise n1ade 'vhile they were mar-
ried to repay a debt to her, and the grantor (and after 
his death, his heirs) claimed the conveyances were made 
in consideration of proinises to support and care for 
grantor, etc .. upon conflicting evidence the lower court 
found in favor of the grantor and the Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision. There is no resemblance in the 
two cases. Lewelling vs. McElroy, supra, again cited, 
has previously been commented upon and distinguished. 
Caldwell vs. Mullin (Colo) 71 Pac. 2nd, 415, is a case 
where grantor conveyed to an only daughter, after 
\vhich time the daughter married. Later the daughter 
and her husband removed from the premises and there-
after rendered no assistance to the father. In the case 
at bar, Hilda was married before the transaction occur-
red, and Catherine, the grantor left against the wishes 
of grantee, Hilda, and did all she could, it is submitted, , 
to make performance on the part of Hilda, and her hus-
ban, Byron, impossible. In the cited case there was no 
evidence that the grantor did anything to prevent per" 
formance by the daughter and the court found that thli 
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grantee was wholly to blame and the grantor blameless. 
rrhere is therefore a vast difference in the evidence upon 
which the trial court based its finding. In Haataza vs. Sa-
arenpaa, 136 N.W. 871 (Minn) the court found that there 
,,. a~ a total failure to perform, hence a total failure of 
eonsideration, and gave rescission. Cree vs. Sherify 
(lnd) 37 N. E. 787, has previously been commented 
upon and distinguished. It will thus be seen from the 
above cases that the remedy of rescission was granted 
'"·here there 'vas a total, or substantially total failure 
of consideration, and equity demanded this sort of re-
lief, and 'vhere the plaintiff was also free from blame. 
The facts in these cases are not analagous to the facts in 
the case at bar, and yet without pointing out wherein the 
other matters contained in the court's findings nos. 10, 
12, and 14 are not supported by the evidence, makes the 
S\\Teeping conclusions that the court erred in making 
them. It is believed that such bald statements as are made 
on page 29 and 30 to the effect that Byron began to turn 
against plaintiff upon conveyance of the real and per-
sonal property, etc., requires no comment. The record 
shows differently and the mere making of such state-
ments does not make them true. Counsel then cites the 
case of Glocke vs. Glocke, (Wis) 89 N. W. 118, 57 
L.R.A. 458. This is a case where there was admittedly 
a glaring abandonmnt and breach of contract, with no 
similarity at all to the case at bar. Ward vs.· Ward and 
Payette vs. Ferrier supra, have both been previously com-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
n1ented upon. Counsel next cites Sprangler, et al. vs Yar-
borough (Okla) 101 Pac.1107, l\[cClelland vs. McClelland 
(Ill) 51 N.E. 559 and Coy"~endall vs l(ellogg (North 
Dakota) 198 N.\V. 472, and then quotes fron1 the first 
t'vo, follo,ved by another quotation from Ward vs. 
'': ard. A reading of the Sprangler and McClelland 
eases discloses an entirely different set of facts, than 
that to 'vhich the language quoted applies. It is difficult 
to see """"hart application this would have on the facts 
in the case at bar. Again ,the quotation-from the Ward 
case overlooks the fact that the trial court did not find 
that either Hilda or Byron so treated plaintiff, and that 
such finding is supported by the evidence. It is believed 
also that the deductions and conclusions drawn by coun-
sel on page 33, and the answers to leading questions re-
ferred to, etc., to page 38 needs no further comment. 
Many of the references are misleading and are only re-
ferences to fragmentary bits of evidence, and do not at 
all refer to contrary testimony. Suffice it to say that the 
trial court who saw the parties and heard the testimony 
concluded otherwise. Furthermore, the law does require 
some degree of cooperation on the part of Catherine, 
even though she is an old lady. Chad. vs. Moser, supra 
It is again submitted that no one could show more con-
sideration and devotion to any person than did Hilda 
to Catherine, in spite of all the trying experiences she 
had with her, and that Byron was also as considerate of 
Catherine as he could possibly be until she, beginning 
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'"ith ahout June 2~, 1949, when she for no sufficient 
rPa~on decided to ''rescind'', herself made it so unpleas-
ant for him that he in the interest of harmony stayed 
:nvay a~ 1uuch as possible. That after this time Cath-
P rine n1ade performance ilnpossible. Counsel then 
quotes fro1n Johnson vs. Paulson (~linn) 114 NW 739. 
1\ reading of this case discloses that the trial court found 
that hecause of the acts of defendants, their faults and 
neglects, the plaintiff 'vas obliged to leave; here· the 
trial court found the reverse situation-that plaintiff 
left in 8pite of all the defendants could do, that she 
had no excuse for leaving, permitted her to return when-
ever she so decided, and provided her with her old hon1e 
auring such time as she chose to remain away. There is 
also a very strong inference in the court's findings in the 
case at bar that plaintiff's apparently ill feelings toward 
the defendant Byron, and the defendant, Hilda, if indeed 
there is any, may pass by most any time at which time 
she 1nay again live with defendants. In the meantin1e 
sl1e is being care for as provided by the decree. This case 
further states: ''that it must clearly appear that the de-
fendant has failed and refused to comply with the con-
ditions upon which the property was conveyed.'' 
On page 38 counsel cites and quotes from Garner 
vs. Frederick (Wash) 165 Pac. 85. This case simply 
stands for the rule that the court reviewed the evidence 
of the trial court and upheld its decision. Counsel next 
cites and quotes from Dodge vs. Dodge (Mich) 52 N. W. 
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uation there found by the court is exactly the rPver~"~ 
to the faetual situation in the ease nt bar. Counsel then 
concludes on page 39-40 that the Ward case supported 
by the decisions in the ~Iichigan, Colorado, and Wash-
ington cases hold, '~That if any condition develops 
het\Yeen the parties so that they cannot live harmon-
iously together, and the grantee does not render the 
services required by the contract, that then there is a 
failure of consideration, and a consequent breach of the 
contract.'' It is submitted that no such rule of law 
is any,vhere laid down. If there was, no grantee could 
be successful if the grantor decided to ''rescind''. The 
court's attention is directed to the fact that all of the 
cases cited and quoted from under appellant's point no. 
2, except the Ward case, are referred to in the annota-
tion beginning at page 676, of 112 A.L.R., and under 
the proposition that rescission is a proper remedy in 
these cases where the grantee repudiates, or substantially 
fails to perform his agreement. There is no basis for 
such statements as counsel makes on page 40 to the effect 
that the defendants exhibited an "avaricious attitude", 
etc., and so no further attention will be given them. 
At page 41 counsel refers to findings of fact no. 5, 
but for 'vhat purpose is not clear, unless it is for pre-
judice. ~ He does not say the finding is not supported by 
the evidence. He says because $2350.00 was spent there 
is a strong inference that the money was spent for de-
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fendants use and benefit. The undisputed evidence is 
other,vise so there is not .even room for an inference. 
See ~rr. 21, Exhibits in Lieu of Deposition, and the 
checks in support- thereof. It is not and cannot be dis-
puted that I-Iilda used $318.95 of her o'vn funds in addi-
tion to that given to her by Catherine. Plaintiff failed 
completely in establishing her allegations in her third 
eause of action and so she now states the purpose 
thereof was not as alleged-to show a 1nis-use of funds, 
hut a different one-to sho'v that the money for the 
1nost part 'vas used for family purposes. If by ''family 
purposes'' appellant means to pay hospital and doctor 
hills and to buy the 1/9th interest in the real property, 
etcq then appellant is correct, and so was the court 
in its finding.s Counsel next says that in practically all 
reported cases facts show that grantee supports grantor 
from grantee's means. But the agreement here is ad-
Ini tedly otherwise so far as the bank accounts 'vere con-
cerned, and so it is difficult to see how it can help 
appellant 'vhat other cases show in this respect. Here 
the bank money 'vas used as per agreement, after which 
Hilda commenced useing her own funds as agreed upon. 
On page 42 counsel refers to finding of fact no. 4. 
He does not say it is not supported by evidence, 
but simply poses a legal question. It is believed the 
question so posed it is identical with other questions 
raised on this appeal and so needs no further comment. 
On page 42 and 43 counsel refers to finding no. 2, 
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It siinply refers to disputed testiinony and ilnmaterial 
~1atters. Certainly during 1949 receipts fron1 the farn1 
,vere not to ·be deposited to plaintiff's bank account. 
Tr. 341 show·s Catherine did .not ""ant Byron to return 
to Ogden. The inferences dra,vn by cousel are violent 
un'varranted and will not be pursued further. 
The rule of law 'vhich applies in the instant case is 
set forth in 9 .... -\.. J ., Cancellation of Instruments, Sec. 31, 
under the heading Breach of Agree1nent to Support 
Grantor, as follows: 
''To entitle one to a decree of cancellation 
the failure to perform on the part of the grantee 
must lie substantial and in relation to material 
matters; and if the grantor prevents the grantee 
from carrying out the contract, there can be no 
presumption of fraud which will justify the set-
ting aside of the deed, the generally accepted rule 
being that, after a partial performance by the 
grantee of his obligation to support grantor, the 
grantor may not abandon the contract, or pre-
vent further performance on the part of the 
grantee, and then take advantage of such failure 
to secure equitable aid to cancel or rescind the 
deed," citing many cases under footnotes 17 and 
18, including annotations in 49 L.R.A. (NS) 1015, 
25 L.R.A. (NS) 932, 43 L.R.A. (NS) 943. 
There is an excellent annotation of the remedies al-
lowed by the courts, assuming there is a breach in 112 
A.L.R. page 697 and pages following. This annotation 
is cited in cumulative supplement to 9 A. J. page 377, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
t~ancellation of Instrun1ents. Further quoting from 9 
A. ,J. Sec 31: ''Relief is conditioned upon the premise 
that grantor does equity, the conveyance being cancelled 
upon ternu.; that are equitable to all concerned", citing 
:~4- ~\. 1 ~. R. 141 and 43 f_j. R. A. (N.S.) 928; L. R. A. 
1 !)17D, 627. 
Our court is committed to the doctrine of restoring 
the parties to status quo: See Rosenthyne vs. Matters-
~lcCulloch Co., 168 Pac. 957; Ifancock vs. Luke, 173 Pac. 
137: Copper King Mining Co. vs. Hanson, 176 Pac. 623. 
9 C. J. Cancellation of Instruments See. 212, 
also provides as follows : ''In several cases, 
'vhere grounds for the cancellation of deeds 1nade 
by aged parents to their children in consideration 
of maintenance and support were not established 
sufficiently to warrant a decree of cancellation, 
defendants were ordered to pay a suitable allow-
ances for the support· of grantors, or other suit-
able arrangements were directed to be made for 
the purpose through the intervention of a mast-
er", citing Patton vs. Nixon (Ore.) 
52 Pac. 1048, and Wilson vs. Wilson (Mich) 125 N. W. 
385, an1ong other cases. Both cases are in point. In 
"\Villian1s vs. Langwiil (Ill) 25 L. R. A. (N.S.) 932, the 
court refused to grant cancellation to grantor. In 43 
L. R. A. (N.S.) 928 citing Haatazay vs. Saarenpaas 136 
N.W. (871) (Minn) and Cornell vs. Whitney (Mich.) 
93 N. W. 614, where the breach was not entire, the gran-
tee 'vas required to pay a stated sum for support of 
grantor so long as he continued to live away from them, 
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and provide hin1 "Tith a ho1ne should he at ~ny thne de-
~ire to return. ''T oolcott v~. ''r oolcott, (l\fich) 95 N. W. 
7 40. ·the grantee \\·a~ required to pay a eertain sum ~o 
long a~ grantor resides else,vhere. In Wilson vs. "\Vilson 
( ~[ich) 125 N. ,V. 385, '"here the acts of both parties 
rendered further perfor1nances hnpossible, the value of 
the support 'vas detern1ined and charged upon the land. 
In Norris vs. Lilly (Cal) 82 Pac 425 it is stated that it 
i~ error to order rescission where defendants have fur· 
nished support and are willing to continue to perforn1 
their part of the contract. In Simons vs. Shafer (Kan) 
160 Pac. 199, where the agreement was carried out for a 
number of years by the son, and after his death, his 
\vido'v and the father were unable to live toether har-
Hlonously she left but offered to pay for his care and 
maintenance furnished by others, the court held that to 
make the cost of further care and support a charge upon 
the lands conveyed was not inequitable. In Patton vs. 
NLxon 52 Pac. 1048, equity disposed of the matter by 
1naking most of maintenance a charge upon the property. 
In Norris vs. Lilly, supra, the court would not grant 
rescission because it appears the grantee did not refuse 
to execute the contract. See also Conley vs. Sharp, 
(Calif) 136 Pac. 2d, 376 and Ampuero vs. Luce, (Calif) 
157 P2d,899 for contra holdings. Further cases and illus-
trations could be given but is is believed that the trial 
court in the case at bar by its decree did all any court in 
equity and good conscience could do in justice to the plain-
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tiff and that the decree likewise is equitable to defendants 
inas1nuch as Hilda previously conveyed her 1/9ths inter-
e:--;t in the property to plaintiff, paid moneys out of her 
o\vn personal funds for her keep and still is paying out of 
lH~r personal funds in compliance with the terms of the 
d~)<·.re<~, that she rendered assistance over the years, be-
fore and since her marriage, made valuable improve-
lnents on the pre1nises, etc., all of which appear more 
full~· front the findings in these several regards, and 
all of \vhich are amply supported by the evidence . 
.. :\ppellant 's Point No. 3.: Here appellant complains 
that the court 1nade a new and different contract to 
the one set out in paragraph 5 of her cornpaint. This 
has been previously ans,vered by stating that from the 
issues 1nade the court found the terms of the contract 
. . 
to ·be as set out in its finding no. 10. Nothing either in 
the contract as found by the court or in the testimony 
adduced at the trial provides or even intimates that 
Hilda should discontinue teaching and devote all of her 
time to the care of Catherine if that is what counsel 
has in 1nind when he says at page 45, that ''defendants 
are relieved of performing the principal duties required 
by the original contract''. In fact the testimony as well 
as the fact that they lived together while Hilda continued 
with her teaching shows clearly there was no such agree-
ment. Furthermore, the citations and illustrations given 
under point no. 3 above, illustrates that the lower court 
in the exercise of equitable principles \vas well within 
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its rights in 1uaking it8 finding no. 11. It is obvious 
that the quotation from -!3 A1n. Jr. 587-Reformation 
of Instru1nents~ has no application to the question under 
consideration. In fact. the scope of the subject n1atter 
excludes the subject of Cancellation and rescission of 
Instruments. See note I, -!5 ~c\_In. Jr., 584. For the same 
reason, Deseret National Bank vs. Burton, (Utah) 53 
P. 215, has no application, it being an action to reform 
a "~ri tten instrument. 
At pages 46-48 counsel agains cites and quotes from 
Payette vs. Ferrier, Thomas vs. Thomas, DeAtley vs. 
Street, Anderson vs. Reed, and Lewelling vs. McElroy, 
supra. All of these have been previously commented on 
herein and as pointed out all of these cases except Le-
'velling vs McElroy is treated in the annotation found 
in 112 A. L. R. following page 676. The quotations 
referred to involve general statements and different 
factual situations and have no bearing so far as the case 
at bar is concerned, and it must therefore follow that the 
comments made on page 49 of brief are obviously in ap-
plicable. It is believed what has previously been said is a 
sufficient answer thereto. 
On pages 49-51 counsel next critisizes the courts 
pronouncement, that it in effect changed its decision, 
manifested a total disregard for plaintiff, concerned 
only for the unjust enrichment of the defendants, accus-
ed the court of promoting the welfare of the defendants, 
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etc. It would have been more appropriate to have 
given 1nore consideration to the evidence adduced, and 
to have recalled the various inquiries the court made 
through the trial which shows that it was at all times 
(leli.berating over an equitable solution of the case. See 
rr,r. 92, 217-18, 314-5, 320-22. Furthermore, it is apparent 
frorn the record that the court took great pains in .arriv-
ing at it's finding of fact, conclusions of law, and decree. 
rl"'he ~ri ticism directed is Un\varranted. 
Appellant's Point No. 4: The record shows the fol-
lovving: The original complaint was filed in the District 
Court of Cache County February 21, 1950; the amended 
cornplaint rnaking both Hilda and Byron parties defend-
ants was filed March 16, 1950, and that this complaint 
by its three causes of actions involved the real estate 
(Ex. Q and P), and the bank accounts. On May 11, 1950, 
by her amendments to amended complaint the plaintiff 
brought into the issues the bill of sale covering the per-
sonal property. The testimony is that the instruments 
n1entioned were executed between January 25, 1949, and 
June 22, 1949, that the transfers of the bank accounts 
were made August 16, 1948, and that between these 
dates, on Feb. 21, 1949, Catherine was the owner of some 
real property in Power County, Idaho, which she on this 
date conveyed to Vadel L. Swenson, and that on the 
same day, Feb. 21, 1949, Vadel L. Swenson and wife, 
Marie P. Swenson, gave a purchase-money mortgage 
ior the balance of the purchase price to Catherine, and 
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that on the 28rd day of February, 194~), by assignment 
of ntortgage (Def~. Ex. :~) (~atherine assigned the H\VPH-
son note and Iuortgage to Hilda. There is no dispu tP 
tT1at this assigninent 'vas transferred to llilda for the 
san1e reason that the other conveyances and transfer~ 
"'"ere Inade ( Tr. 239-40), but counsel clai1ns that inas-
Inneh as the property secured by the n1ortgage is sit-
uated in Idaho that the suit n1ust be tried in Power 
County, Idaho because the facts Inake out a suit to quiet 
title. On May 25, 1950, according to appellant's brief, 
page 51, after filing of above complaints, the plaintiff 
c.on1n1enced her action to set aside the assignment of the 
note and mortgage (Defs. Ex. 3) in Power County, Idaho, 
'vhere the mortgage-property is situated, and on June 12, 
1950, some months after the institution of the action in 
the case at bar and on the day of the commencement of 
trial herein, summons was served on the defendants. 
On June 21, 1950, defendants filed herein their petition 
to interplead the First National Bank of Logan, Utah, 
as a party defendant, and also presented the court with 
their motion to amend their answer for the purpose of 
bringing within the issues of the case at bar the ques-
tion of the transfer of the note and mortgage by reason 
of the execution and delivery of said assignment. (Tr~ 
33-37). That on June 23, 1950, the First National 
Bank filed its reply. See Discussion between court and 
counsel (Tr. 85-93). Court then permitted the amend-
ment and gave plaintiff time to plead if she desired. 
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After a full hearing the court decided the issue as per 
it finding no. 13. 
rl'he plaintiff did not own any real property in Pow-
er County, Idaho. She had sold it. Certainly a note 
and mortgage and the assignment thereof is personal 
property and the dispute over the ownership thereof is 
an action in personam. It is not local. It does not 
make it a suit to quiet title by simply calling it such. 
Plaintiff and defendants are all residents of the State 
of Utah. The court had jurdisdiction of all the parties 
who had anything to do with the transaction; in fact 
they were all before the court. It would be inequitable 
to split the action and at great expense and inconven-
ience require the parties to go to American Falls, Idaho, 
the county seat of Power County, when the Cache County 
Court had all the parties before it and while it was try-
ing the issues of the same transaction or agreement 
involving the other items of property mentioned in plain-
tiff's complaints. Courts frown upon and splitting is 
permitted. Felt City Townsite Co. vs. Felt Investment 
Co., (Utah) 167 Pac. 835. National Union Fire Ins. 
vs. Denver D. R. G. Co., (Utah) 137 Pac. 653. This is 
the identical situation covered by Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rules 12 (b), 18, 19, 20) ; the question on the 
assignment arose out of the same transaction or occur-
rences, or series of transactions or occurences, as did the 
subject matter embraced within the ·other causes of ac-
tion brought by plaintiff before this court. The action 
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brought ",.as one in rescission. The land upon \vhieh the 
n1ortgage existed 'vas not affeeted, nor \VaB the title 
thereto in dispute. Furthern1ore., counsel could not 
have hen mislead by the court as he says he 'vas at page 
53 of brief. _A_ reading of the references given thor-
oughly dissipates any such contention. 
The quotation taken fro1n 12 C. J. 478 is clearly in-
applicable. The facts here involved did not bring into 
question any of the 1natters involved in the quote. 
The quotations given fron1 Knudsen vs. Lythman, 
(Idaho) 200 Pac. 130, is likewise inapplicable. The 
ackno,vledgement of part of the property involved in 
the foreclosure proceeding was made by the mortgagee 
himself and it was not accomplished as provided for 
by the laws of the State of Idaho, and was therefore 
held to be invalid. The case of Hanaah vs. Vensel, 
(Idaho) 116 Pac. 115, is also clearly inapplicable. No 
such questions are presented in the case at bar. When 
matters are local, Utah follows the same rule: Conant 
vs. Deep Creek Curlew Val. Irr. Co. (Utah) 66 Pac. 
188. 
In 14 Am. Jr. page 422, it is stated: "An action is 
transitory, within the meaning of this rule, when the 
transaction on which it is based might have taken place 
anywhere'', citing among other cases Taylor vs. Som-
mers Bros. Match Co., (Idaho) 204 Pac. 472. In this 
Idaho case it clearly appears that even Idaho follows 
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the rule quoted at page 475 the court states as 
l'ollo\\·H, "---That the action was one for damages done 
to the ho1ueHtead rights of plaintiffs in said land, and 
not for the value of the timber destroyed'', thus indi-
cating that if it were, the jurdisdictional question would 
he decided differently. See also 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) (279) 
In Allen vs Allen (Utah) 151 Pac. 982, the action was 
held to be transitory where defendant's cattle in Idaho 
Pntered upon plaintiff's land in Idaho and ate plaintiff's 
,,·heat \vhich was in stacks, and the suit was for damages 
therefor, but no damages for injuries to the realty were 
claimed, and our supreme court held the action is tran-
sitory and need not be brought in the state in which the 
land was located. See further 14 Am. Jur. SEC. 242 page 
434 also annotation in 113 A.L.R. beginning page 940; and 
for further discussion and citations as to whether ac-
tions are local or transitory see Hogevoll vs Hogevoll 
(Mont) 162 Pac. 2d 222 (9-12). It is submitted, there-
fore, that appellant's assignment is not well taken and 
that the lower court properly assumed jurisdiction and 
decided the matter. 
In conclusion it is submitted that each and every 
finding of fact made by the trial court is abundantly 
supported by competent evidence, and that the conclus-
inons of Jaw and decree based thereon are correct and 
dispenses justice between the parties; that Hilda having 
over the years cared for and assisted Catherine during 
her illnesses and otherwise, conveyed to her 1/9th in-
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terest in property. spent of her O\vn funds, and that 
after her nutrriage both l-Iilda and B~·ron rare for (~ath­
erine until she unrPnsonably and "·ithont ~ufficiPnt 
rea~on left and ''Tould no longer accept assistance, made 
per1nanent ilnproven1ents upon the pre1uise8, 'vorked and 
adYanced 1noney for her during the year 1948 \vhich 
the court found to be of the value of $1200.00, bought 
expensive farn1 1nachinery \vhich if now must be sold 
they \rill sustain a further loss, adjusted their lives in an 
ilnportant \vay by not seeking other e1nployment and 
InoYing to :Jlendon, (and since the decree have Inade 
the payinents provided for therein) that the court could 
not in equity and good conscience have decreed otherwise 
and that the decree is extremely fair to the plaintiff and 
protects her in every possible \vay; and furthermore, 
if for any reason the court should reverse the trial 
court then it is further submitted that it should be done 
upon such terms as to reimburse and make whole and re-
store the defendants to their status quo as much as 
possible. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE C. HEINRICH 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
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